Food Fraud Vulnerability assessment: reliable data sources and effective assessment approaches by Manning, L & Soon, J
©Louise Manning and Jan Mei Soon   1 
 
Food Fraud Vulnerability assessment: reliable data sources and effective assessment 1 
approaches 2 
Manning L.1 and Soon J.M2 3 
1Royal Agricultural University, Stroud Road, Cirencester, GL7 6LS UK 4 
 2International Institute of Nutritional Sciences and Applied Food Safety Studies, School 5 
of Sport and Wellbeing, University of Central Lancashire, Preston PR1 2HE UK 6 
 7 
Corresponding author email: JMSoon@uclan.ac.uk 8 
 9 
Accepted by Trends in Food Science and Technology 10 
Abstract 11 
Multiple food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) tools have been developed and refined 12 
to capture and quantify food fraud issues in the supply chain. The aim of this research is to 13 
review existing FFVA tools and the databases that underpin them and consider the challenges, 14 
limitations and opportunities in their use. The databases considered include: the Rapid Alert 15 
for Food and Feed Safety (RASFF) database, the Food Fraud Risk Information, Decernis Food 16 
Fraud Database, FoodSHIELD, and HorizonScan. Four FFVA tools, Safe Supply of Affordable 17 
Food Everywhere (SSAFE), the two Food Fraud Advisor’s vulnerability assessment tools and 18 
EMAlert, are also critiqued in this paper from the viewpoint of the tools available and their 19 
efficacy for food fraud vulnerability assessment.  20 
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 Vulnerability has multiple attributes that need to be considered in a risk assessment. 23 
 Multiple data source exist their use is limited by subscription only access. 24 
 Behavioural assessment is a key aspect of FFVA tools 25 
 26 
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1. Introduction 28 
   Food fraud involves intentional modification of food products and/or associated 29 
documentation for economic gain and may lead to issues of food safety, legality and/or quality 30 
depending on the activities undertaken or the agent(s) used. Food manufacturers, as part of the 31 
assessment of their vulnerability to food fraud need to identify the individual food materials 32 
and products that they procure, supply and/or produce that have a history of illicit activity. 33 
Supply chains are complex networks that are shaped by the inter-relationships between actors, 34 
the processes undertaken and the inputs and outputs associated with those processes (Wang, 35 
van Fleet & Mishral, 2017).  Due to the high incidence of reported problems in the past, certain 36 
food types, geographic sources and associated supply chains are seen as having historically 37 
higher levels of concern with regard to food fraud. For a given supplier organisation, service 38 
or ingredient, historic levels of compliance can be used to determine foods or ingredients that 39 
are vulnerable to food fraud.  These foods include fish, meat, cereals, milk, olive oil, organic 40 
product and spices (Xiu & Klein, 2010; Silvis, van Ruth, van der Fels-Klerx & Luning, 2017; 41 
van Ruth, Huisman & Luning, 2017). Food fraud is an overarching term and the sub-types of 42 
food fraud determined in the literature and emergent standards are outlined in Table 1. 43 
Take in Table 1 44 
For perpetrators, successful modes of food fraud are measured in terms of the degree of 45 
financial gain when compared with the risk of detection (Manning & Soon, 2014). As 46 
opportunities arise, and the risk of detection decreases, the effort required to commit crime for 47 
the benefit derived is reduced. In contrast, the higher the probability of being detected or 48 
caught, the lower the returns for the fraudster (Spink & Moyer, 2011a). From an anti-fraud 49 
perspective, it is difficult to predict where fraud may occur as fraudsters, if their modus 50 
operandi is to remain undiscovered, are constantly required to identify new opportunities and 51 
channels for committing fraud (Kingston, 2017). The key to preventing food fraud is the 52 
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development of measures to assess, detect, mitigate and where possible prevent it from 53 
occurring. However, Everstine, Spink & Kennedy (2013) assert that economically motivated 54 
adulteration (EMA)  differs from other food threats as it is not readily predicted through food 55 
safety risk assessments and intervention strategies. Instead food fraud vulnerability assessment 56 
(FFVA) systematically considers the factors that create vulnerabilities in a supply chain, i.e. 57 
where food fraud is more likely to occur (Nestle, n.d.). 58 
The Global Food Safety Initiative (GFSI, 2018) defines a food fraud vulnerability as “the 59 
susceptibility or exposure to a food fraud risk, which is regarded as a gap or deficiency that 60 
could place consumer health at risk if not addressed”. It is important to differentiate between 61 
intrinsic vulnerabilities i.e. those vulnerabilities that occur within the business at the micro 62 
(individual) and meso (organisational level) and extrinsic vulnerabilities that occur at the 63 
macro level in the external environment, and as a result are more difficult for the business to 64 
control. GFSI (2018) distinguishes between a hazard, (something with the a potential to cause 65 
harm), and risk (the probability of loss or injury from a hazard), stating that susceptibility to a 66 
[given] risk is not only linked to the severity of the risk, but also to the company’s awareness 67 
of their weakness and also how they manage it.  This concept provides a distinct approach to 68 
considering vulnerability, and underpins the rational for this paper. In this context, the aim of 69 
this review is to provide context through comparing and contrasting risk assessment and 70 
vulnerability assessment and then analysing existing FFVA tools and the databases that 71 
underpin them. This approach allows assessment of the consistency of how food fraud 72 
vulnerability is determined by different models. 73 
2. Risk assessment versus vulnerability assessment 74 
2.1 Risk assessment 75 
Risk assessment is the overall process of risk identification, risk analysis and risk 76 
evaluation. International Standardisation Organisation (ISO) Guide 73 (2009) states risk 77 
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assessment (finding, recognising and describing risk) leads into risk analysis, (the process to 78 
understand the risk and determine its likelihood), and risk evaluation.  The Guide highlights 79 
that risk evaluation is the process of comparing the results of risk analysis with risk criteria to 80 
determine firstly the significance of the risk and whether that degree of risk is acceptable i.e. it 81 
is a risk identification and quantification process. This approach is thus a separate activity from 82 
risk management. Risk management is situated to an organisation’s activities and drives an 83 
approach that leads to continuous improvement in seeking to eliminate or reduce risk. Risk 84 
management is integrated into all organisational activities; involves a structured and 85 
comprehensive focus that is dynamic and reflects internal and external risk factors; is inclusive 86 
and ensures appropriate and timely involvement of necessary stakeholders and considers the 87 
degree of uncertainty in the data available; and uses a holistic approach that considers the social 88 
(human and cultural) factors that influence risk (ISO 31000, 2018).   89 
Zio (2016, p141) highlights the dangers of reducing risk assessment to a given number or 90 
value because “the values of probability in two different situations could be the same, but their 91 
assignment may be based on quite different knowledge, data and information, and eventually 92 
assumptions [or degrees of uncertainty], which leave quite different room for surprises of 93 
unforeseen events and related consequences.” These concerns have particular emphasis when 94 
considering food fraud risk assessment to then inform risk management systems. Indeed 95 
Manning (2019) argues that predictive risk assessment tools such as hazard analysis critical 96 
control point (HACCP), threat analysis critical control point (TACCP), and vulnerability 97 
analysis critical control point, (VACCP) have limited value in terms of unknown or 98 
unquantifiable food crime threats creating the potential for supply chain vulnerabilities to be 99 
both unknowable and unrecognised. 100 
The PAS 96 (2017) Guide highlights the process of undertaking risk assessment for food 101 
crime including food fraud throughout a food business. The risk assessment process requires 102 
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the semi-quantitative determination of likelihood and impact, deriving a risk score and then 103 
prioritising a risk management process to reduce risk. The process is supported by a risk matrix 104 
leading to the development of a threat identification matrix that at each process step identifies 105 
threats, vulnerabilities, access, mitigation, and testing programmes. TACCP is thus a risk 106 
assessment and a risk management methodology that uses a risk matrix to prioritise internal 107 
and external risk associated with fraud in order to prioritise the allocation of resources and the 108 
weighting can be arbitary.   109 
 2.2 Vulnerability assessment 110 
Vulnerability is a measure of a system’s susceptibility, or conversely resilience, to threat 111 
scenarios whereas the level of risk focuses on the consequences and their severity should a 112 
threat be realised (Ezell, 2007).  Zio (2016) suggests there are multiple perceptions of 113 
vulnerability and this will ultimately affect how individuals or teams assess vulnerability. 114 
Vulnerability can be considered as a product, technical or system attribute namely: 115 
a. The extent to which vulnerability is a weakness or flaw i.e. vulnerability as a “gap or 116 
an element of the system that is missing”. An organisation can apply vulnerability 117 
assessment internally or externally to a whole supply chain in order to identify the weak 118 
areas or hotspots that are vulnerable to food fraud. An internal vulnerability assessment 119 
aids understanding of the weaknesses, criticalities and access points within a specific 120 
manufacturing environment where there are food fraud vulnerabilities;  121 
b. By seeing vulnerability as a risk i.e. the degree of exposure (likelihood x severity) 122 
through the use of tools such as HACCP, TACCP or VACCP;  123 
c. Through considering vulnerability in terms of the consequences i.e. the degree of loss 124 
or damages;  125 
 126 
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d. By assessing vulnerability in terms of it reducing the capacity of an organisation or 127 
supply chain  to return to a steady state i.e. determining vulnerability  in terms of ability 128 
to return to the status quo; or 129 
e. As failure to be resilient where resilience is seen as continuous improvement into the 130 
long term i.e. determining vulnerability as a failure to be sustainable.  131 
As previously explored in this paper, vulnerability can also be assessed at the micro, meso 132 
and macro level of a food system with the resultant challenge that vulnerability assessment 133 
requires systems rather than linear (cause and effect) thinking. Vulnerability assessment, if 134 
undertaken appropriately, can define the actions required to eliminate weak points, or 135 
vulnerability points, and reduce the potential for food fraud to a level the organisation deems 136 
acceptable. The GFSI Position Statement on Mitigating the Public Health Risk of Food Fraud 137 
(GFSI, 2014) defines FFVA as a two-stage approach. Firstly,  “ information is collected at the 138 
appropriate points along the supply chain (including raw materials, ingredients, products, 139 
packaging) and evaluated to identify and prioritise significant vulnerabilities for food fraud”  140 
and then secondly, appropriate control measures need to be in place to reduce the risk arising 141 
from these vulnerabilities. (GFSI, 2014). Thus, a relevant FFVA informs the development of a 142 
control plan. Four years later, the GFSI develop this rationale further into two elements a 143 
FFVA, and then a food fraud mitigation plan (GFSI, 2018). Therefore, vulnerability assessment 144 
considers the strength, or weakness, of an organisation’s food fraud mitigation strategy (Cavin, 145 
Cottenet, Blancpain, Bessaire, Frank, & Zbinden, 2016).  146 
Marvin et al. (2016) drew together a set of variables that influence an organisation’s 147 
vulnerability to food fraud. These criteria including economic factors (e.g. price, supply and 148 
demand); national factors associated with the country of origin (e.g. governance) and specific 149 
incident related factors such as fraud type, complexity and the potential for fraud detection 150 
to then be able to identify headline predictors of food fraud. Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC, 151 
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2016) differentiates between economic and market factors such as economic conditions, value 152 
attributes, financial strains, level of competition and associated strategies, and supply/demand 153 
and pricing and cultural and behavioral factors such as personal gain or desperation, 154 
corruption level, blackmail, victimisation and ethical business culture.  As well as the 155 
determination of what vulnerability is and how vulnerability is articulated within FFVA tools, 156 
the other factor that influences the effectiveness of these tools is the source, situational 157 
applicability, quality and validity of the data and then the type of methodological assessment 158 
approach in which the data is used. A typology of sampling has been synthesized in this 159 
research that is utilised within this paper to differentiate between data and information sources 160 
used for a given FFVA (Table 2). 161 
Take in Table 2 162 
The type of sampling is important because it has an impact on how the dataset that is 163 
derived can be interpreted. The data can be influenced by whether its source is from regulatory 164 
sampling that is based on purposive, random, probability or suspect sampling (see Table 2). 165 
Further, the sampling method will influence the accuracy of assessment and also the level of 166 
confidence that can be attributed to the result. Further, differentiated categorisation of incidents 167 
in databases together with differences in the rationale for how the data is collected can reduce 168 
the opportunity for comparative analysis and influence the ability to compare or pool data from 169 
multiple datasets (Kowalska, Soon & Manning, 2018). This makes the assessment of food fraud 170 
vulnerability based on information held in databases an evolving art. 171 
3. Food information databases 172 
This section compares a series of databases that contain information that can be used 173 
by an organisation in assessing their internal or external vulnerability to food fraud. Five 174 
databases critiqued here are either open access platforms e.g. the European Union (EU) Rapid 175 
Alert for Food and Feed Safety Portal (RASFF) and others are commercial databases that 176 
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require a subscription payment for access or have some free to access components and other 177 
pay to download elements.   178 
3.1 Rapid Alert for Food and Feed Safety (RASFF) Portal - Information Exchange 179 
Forum 180 
The RASFF provides an information exchange forum for member states and regulatory 181 
bodies to provide food and feed control authorities with information about the measures taken 182 
to respond to serious problems either detected in relation to food or feed being imported into 183 
the EU or being transferred within the EU (RASFF, 2017). These problems include food safety 184 
issues and instances of food fraud. The EU RASFF database is a centralised and searchable 185 
database where urgent notifications can be sent, received and responded to (RASFF, 2018). 186 
Members, including the European Commission, EU members, the European Food Safety 187 
Authority (EFSA), the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) Surveillance Authority, (i.e. 188 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway) and Switzerland (RASFF, 2018).  189 
The EU Administrative Assistance and Cooperation (AAC) system operates alongside 190 
the RASFF system with the aim of effective information sharing to ensure a swift reaction 191 
following detection of public health risks in the food chain and the EU Food Fraud 192 
Network (FFN) exchanges information within this system (EC, 2019a). However, data is not 193 
freely available except in the form of historic reports. The FFN was established to manage 194 
requests for cross-border cooperation and to ensure the rapid exchange of information between 195 
the Commission and national authorities in the event of suspected fraudulent practices 196 
(Bouzembrak et al. 2018). The use of the RASFF database, either solely or in conjunction with 197 
data from national databases has informed research into the types of incidents as well as the 198 
value of such databases in informing risk or vulnerability assessment (Tähkäpää, Maijala, 199 
Korkeala & Nevas, 2015; Bouzembrak & Marvin, 2016; Marvin et al. 2016). However it should 200 
be noted that the data comes from a variety of sources and whilst some standardisation of food 201 
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classifications has taken place these classifications do not replicate those in other databases 202 
which limits the drawing of inference from the pooling of information from multiple datasets 203 
The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA, nd) states: “A standardised system for 204 
classifying and describing food makes it easier to compare data from different sources and 205 
perform more detailed types of data analysis.” The system used by the EFSA for classification 206 
is FoodEx2. The EFSA uses RASFF data together with other data from competent authorities 207 
throughout the EU to inform the risk assessments undertaken. The EFSA also differentiate 208 
between databases in terms of the degree of openness of a dataset and define four maturity 209 
levels: 210 
 Beginners: in the early stages of transition to an open data policy;  211 
 Followers: with a basic open data policy and some advanced features on their portal, 212 
but there are limitations for the public use/reuse of datasets;  213 
 Fast trackers: greater advancement in their open data journey than followers; and 214 
 Leaders: who have implemented an advanced open data policy with extensive portal 215 
features (Foster et al. 2019).  216 
These criteria will be used to determine the maturity of the databases considered in this paper 217 
in the critique in Table 3. 218 
Take in Table 3 219 
3.2 Food Fraud Risk Information Database 220 
Food Fraud Risk Information (https://trello.com/b/aoFO1UEf/food-fraud-risk-221 
information) is a free and accessible database on incidences of food fraud and emerging threats 222 
(Food Fraud Advisors, 2017; Food Fraud Risk Information, n.d.). The site is designed in an 223 
easy to navigate manner with highlights of the most recent food fraud incidences by month or 224 
by product category. The site allows users to view incidences according to food and drink 225 
categories including packaging materials and marketing claims. There is an internal risk rating 226 
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(low through to high), but the criteria for how risk has been determined is not outlined. 227 
Individual incidents can be accessed for free but there is no free downloadable reporting 228 
function. A static off-line historic database can be downloaded as an Excel spreadsheet for a 229 
on-off fee.  The source of information is important here especially in terms of its validity and 230 
representativeness. Through exposing incidents, the media plays an increasingly important role 231 
in providing the evidence that underpins food fraud governance, influencing the behaviour and 232 
attitudes of government, food producers and consumers. However, Zhu, Huang and Manning 233 
(2019) highlight there is a difference between the number and type of incident being reported 234 
by government reports and those by the media as the media tends to report incidents that have 235 
a public interest element and outline more of a “story” associated with the problem (see also 236 
the work of Bouzembrak et al. 2018). In essence, developing databases through the use of 237 
media material as a source of evidence means that such databases are socially rather than an 238 
objectively constructed, thus the evidence is not independent of the social norms that frame it. 239 
3.3 Decernis Food Fraud Database 240 
The former US Pharmacopoeia (USP) Food Fraud Mitigation Database has been 241 
renamed the Food Fraud Database and is owned by Decernis. The food fraud database contains 242 
information about more than 4000 ingredients with 9000 related records that arise from a 243 
variety of sampling activities and methods of data collection (Decernis, 2019). The global 244 
database is continuously updated with information from scientific articles, media, regulatory 245 
and judicial reports and food industry and trade associations. The database is not open access.  246 
The database is developed with incident and inference reports, surveillance records, and 247 
analytical methods classified by ingredient (Decernis, 2019). The database allows searching 248 
and trend identification with weekly EMA incident reports. The incident reports are given a 249 
weighting factor based on the quality of source/evidence with high being allocated to scientific 250 
or legal sources and media sources being assigned either a medium or low weighting.  251 
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This means that the weighting is based on an objective-subjective paradigm i.e. from 252 
objective scientific or legal data to subjective, often socially constructed reports. 253 
3.4 Food Adulteration Incidents Registry (FAIR) 254 
The US Food Protection and Defense Institute (FPDI), is located at the University of 255 
Minnesota. The FPDI’s Food Adulteration Incidents Registry (FAIR) is a database that 256 
compiles global data on both EMA and intentional adulteration of foods. It provides limited 257 
access to all users to search entries such as food category, date, adulterated food products, 258 
adulterants, method of adulteration and originated location (FAIR, 2019). However, access to 259 
recent incidents (within the 5 past years) requires the payment of a subscription. The database 260 
catalogues a wide range of EMA incidents and is searchable according to incident 261 
characteristics such as food adulterant, production location, data, morbidity or mortality data 262 
within a wider interaction of databases for food fraud and food defense. 263 
3.5 Food Integrity Network (FIN) 264 
The Food Integrity (FI) Network (FIN, 2019) is a platform for stakeholders and experts to 265 
exchange knowledge and expertise in food authenticity, safety and quality; and to rapidly share 266 
information and intelligence about suspected and actual incidents to protect consumers and 267 
food products from damaging effects of food misdescription (Source: 268 
https://secure.fera.defra.gov.uk/foodintegrity/expertdb/index.cfm). HorizonScan is an 269 
associated global database that monitors commodity safety (more than 500 commodities), 270 
tracks over 22,000 suppliers and scans the  official sites of over 180 countries and more than 271 
100 independent sources daily. The database is searchable by commodity. It is a subscriber 272 
only service (FERA, 2019). Email alerts can be tailored to the commodities and issues 273 
important to the food business. 274 
3.6 European Commission’s Joint Research Centre Europe Media Monitor 275 
(EMM)  System 276 
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The EMM allows users to explore current news items reported by the world’s online 277 
media in 70 languages over 20000 RSS feeds and HTML pages sites from 7000 generic news 278 
portals and 20 commercial news wires (EMM, 2019). The Medical Information System or 279 
Medisys is a subset of this dataset that seeks to identify potential threats to public health e.g. 280 
communicable disease, terrorist attacks or chemical or nuclear accidents (EMM, 2019). 281 
Medisys (Source: http://medisys.newsbrief.eu/) continuously monitors about 900 specialist 282 
medical sites plus all the generic EMM news on the main site. The open access site but requires 283 
specific searching to access information on food fraud issues. The JRC provide a monthly news 284 
report which is freely available online about food fraud incidents. 285 
 Researchers have used the Medisys database in their research. An Early Warning 286 
System (EWS) was developed that can detect potential food fraud (Mojtahed, 2018). EWS 287 
harvests data from the EMM that analyses, curates and aggregates information from traditional 288 
and social media globally (EU Science Hub, 2017). The EWS has been further refined and 289 
developed into a food fraud tool (MedISys-FF) that collects, analyses and presents food fraud 290 
reports published in worldwide media (Bouzembrak et al. 2018). The tool was benchmarked 291 
against RASFF, EMA (now FAIR) and HorizonScan and the MedISys-FF system collected 292 
food fraud information with high relevance (>75%).   293 
3.7 The US Food And Drug Administration (FDA) Recalls, Market Withdrawals 294 
and Safety Alerts Database 295 
The US FDA Recalls, Market Withdrawals and Safety Alerts Database is the US 296 
regulators database of recalls (older information is archived but available). The database is 297 
searchable and the data can be filtered using key words (see 298 
https://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/). This database has a wider scope than food fraud as it 299 
includes all incidents that required a regulatory recall. 300 
3.8 UK Food Surveillance System (UKFSS) Database 301 
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The UKFSS is a UK regulatory database that records the analytical and examination 302 
results for all food and feed samples, submitted for analysis and/or examination by official 303 
control laboratories on behalf of UK local authorities and port health authorities (Food 304 
Standards Agency (FSA), 2019). In Scotland, the food sampling data is held separately in the 305 
Scottish Food Sampling Database. This public analysis data is not available to the public as an 306 
open source. 307 
3.9 Private laboratory databases 308 
 Major private laboratories that provide analytical testing and services could contribute 309 
formally or informally to the creation, validation and sharing of the data. In the UK such 310 
organisations including Campden BRI. Campden BRI have also established with their food 311 
company members the Food Industry Intelligence Network (FIIN). The objectives of FIIN are:  312 
 To help ensure the integrity of food supply chains and protect the interests of the 313 
consumer; 314 
 To address the recommendations from “The Elliott Report” (Elliott, 2014) for industry 315 
to establish a ‘safe haven’ to collect, collate, analyse and disseminate information and 316 
intelligence; 317 
 To share intelligence with governmental bodies to better understand where risks may 318 
sit in the UK Food Industry from food fraud, and 319 
 To help divert, detect, deter and disrupt those activities and in doing so, further enhance 320 
the reputation of the UK Food Industry (CBRI, 2019). 321 
Other private testing laboratories also hold data on food fraud incidents that may, or may 322 
not, be openly available. 323 
3.10 Summary 324 
 This section has highlighted the range of databases that can be used to identify historic levels 325 
of a particular kind of food fraud associated with a particular food, country or company. The 326 
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databases are mostly subscribe to view which makes it difficult for small and medium sized 327 
companies (SMEs) to access this data in order to be better informed when undertaking FFVA. 328 
Spink, Moyer and Speier-Pero (2016) differentiate between four sources of data that ultimately 329 
inform FFVA for a given organisation: static external databases, dynamic external internet 330 
searches and automated keyword alerts (e.g. Google Alerts); internal datasets on known food 331 
fraud incidents within the organisation and lastly subject matter expert insight databases e.g. 332 
through groups such as FIIN.  Spink, Moyer and Speier-Pero (2016) also developed a four stage 333 
food fraud risk assessment. The first stage was a Food Fraud Initial Screening (FFIS) step as a 334 
precursor to a FFVA leading to a Corporate Risk Map and then a Resource Allocation Decision. 335 
The FFIS approach is divided into 4 steps:  336 
(i) define the assessment scope (e.g. specify supply chain and region) and qualitative 337 
risk ranking terminologies (e.g. very high / high / medium / low / very low);  338 
(ii) (ii) review incidents and suspicious activities (e.g. derived from internal sources, 339 
expert opinion or external databases);  340 
(iii) (iii) screen for health hazards and enterprise risks (e.g. risk assess and rank health 341 
hazard and enterprise [financial] risks and post the screening phase, and then to  342 
(iv) (iv) plot the food fraud risks on a risk matrix.  343 
Once completed, the business can then prioritise risks and make informed decisions on the 344 
application of resources to mitigate the risk. Spink et al. (2016) conclude that the main 345 
advantage of FFIS is that the initial screening will allow for product groups with lower risks or 346 
with established controls to be removed from a following FFVA thus allowing subsequent 347 
vulnerability assessment to focus more specifically on higher risks. In order to undertake FFIS 348 
and the FFVA effectively, the assessment team needs to have access to appropriate data that 349 
can inform their decision-making. The tools that are available for FFVA are now considered. 350 
4.0 Food fraud vulnerability assessment (FFVA) tools 351 
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  The development of FFVA tools and the extent of their usage is now critiqued.  The Wolfe 352 
and Hermanson (2004) seminal “fraud diamond” model proposes that four factors influence 353 
the potential for fraud: motivation, pressure, capability, and opportunity. Capability depends 354 
on the individual perpetrators and their ability to undertake fraudulent activities and 355 
opportunity to commit the activity, and also the degree of deterrence (Kowalska, Soon, & 356 
Manning, 2018). Pressure in this context can be considered to be regulatory or political pressure 357 
or alternatively supply chain pressure which can be influenced by market dynamics such as 358 
supply and demand gaps, cost pressures, and increasing pressure to meet supply chain 359 
standards. Motivation to commit fraud can be simply economic gain, other forms of self-360 
interest or a wish to cause disruption or chaos. The FFVA concept by van Ruth, Huisman & 361 
Luning (2017) consists of three key elements and six groups of factors: two elements of the 362 
fraud diamond: opportunities (in time and place), motivations (economic drivers, culture and 363 
behaviour), and also vulnerability reduction in terms of implementing effective control 364 
measures (technical and managerial measures). The FFVA tool was developed and made 365 
available as a free downloadable app (van Ruth, Luning, Silvis, Yang, & Huisman, 2018). 366 
4.1 Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) 367 
Safe Supply of Affordable Food Everywhere (SSAFE) is a not for profit organisation 368 
supported by a range of multi-national corporations that has developed a free, science-based 369 
online FFVA tool (Excel spreadsheet, online or a phone app) that could be used across the food 370 
supply chain (http://www.ssafe-food.org/our-projects/?proj=365#) (SSAFE, 2019). SSAFE 371 
developed the FFVA tool with Price Waterhouse Cooper (PwC), Wageningen University, VU 372 
University Amsterdam and following consultation with global food industry leaders (PwC, 373 
2019). The use of this tool is advocated by the GFSI (2014). The advantage of the tool is its 374 
flexibility and applicability to different products, business size and region. Other key strengths 375 
associated with this tool is its versatility (available in 11 languages and maximise tool 376 
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accessibility), and its online and offline usage capability. The tool is built upon the principles 377 
of HACCP as the FFVA also requires a team approach (e.g. security, finance, quality 378 
assurance). Users are guided by an initial decision tree analysis to determine the scope of 379 
assessment and then are taken through a series of questions (n=50). Each question contains 3 380 
fixed answers. This tool uses a systematic approach where users are provided with an 381 
explanation of why the question is important and each fixed answer contains information to 382 
assist users in selecting the most appropriate answer. Once completed, users will be able to 383 
assess the level of food fraud vulnerability and the means for its control (SSAFE, 2019). This 384 
tool is designed to be a practical vulnerability assessment tool suited to guiding manufacturers 385 
who may not have detailed and specific knowledge on food fraud and vulnerability. SSAFE 386 
can be used as both an intrinsic and extrinsic vulnerability assessment tool. Examples of 387 
intrinsic vulnerability assessed by SSAFE are internal processing activities, ethical business 388 
culture and business strategies. Extrinsic vulnerability can include the price of raw materials, 389 
corruption level of countries where suppliers are located and the level of competition across a 390 
selected food sector. The tool does not provide for developing specific mitigation techniques 391 
for a given vulnerability, but instead users can refer to information sources and references 392 
provided in the tool for further guidance.   393 
4.2 Food Fraud Advisor’s Vulnerability Assessment Tool  394 
Food Fraud Advisors have designed two types of vulnerability assessment tool one being 395 
the generic FFVA (now version 3) and the other based on the method recommended by the 396 
British Retail Consortium (Food Fraud Advisors, 2018).  The tools are based on Excel 397 
spreadsheets that develop a vulnerability assessment for each raw material and ultimately a 398 
report that can be used for management and third party audits (see Table 4). The tool is not free 399 
a fee is payable for its use. 400 
Take in Table 4 401 
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The FFVA BRC Method tool allows the user to assess their raw materials and ingredients 402 
only for vulnerability to EMA, substitution and dilution. A series of questions are used to assess 403 
the likelihood of occurrence (e.g. historic incidents, price fluctuations, complexity of supply 404 
chain) and likelihood of detection (e.g. direct sourcing, supply chain audits, routine testing) by 405 
answering simple yes / no questions. Answers and user’s comments are generated in the results 406 
page providing food businesses with the scope, vulnerability rating and description of the 407 
characteristics of the raw materials / ingredients. The extrinsic vulnerability rating is based on 408 
a semi-quantitative 5 x 5 matrix of likelihood of occurrence x likelihood of detection which 409 
generates three levels of risks (high, medium and low). The questions do address elements of 410 
the fraud diamond including pressure, capability and detection. 411 
The other conventional FFVA is designed to meet the requirements of GFSI food safety 412 
standards such as FSSC 22000 and has a wider scope in terms of the types of food fraud 413 
addressed (see Table 1) and the scope includes processing aids and packaging. There is also 414 
the option of the pre-screening method. This approach can then inform the controls required to 415 
reduce vulnerability. 416 
4.3 EMAlert – Economically Motivated Adulteration – Vulnerability Assessment Tool 417 
The Grocery Manufacturers Association (GMA) and Battelle have worked in partnership to 418 
develop EMAlert, a software tool that enables food manufacturers to analyse and understand 419 
EMA vulnerabilities (EMAlert, 2019). This tool is different to the others in that it includes a 420 
behavioural model to consider fraudster decision making and how this impacts on food fraud 421 
vulnerability. The tool is a pay for use subscription based system. The advantage of this system 422 
is that it can assess a greater number of commodities (50) in one analysis compared with 423 
SSAFE and EMAlert considers economic (motivation, pressure, opportunity), ease (capability) 424 
and historical drivers. 425 
4.4 Challenges with FFVA 426 
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The challenge with FFVA is that there is a risk of under or over predicting when using 427 
the qualitative criteria developed within the assessment tools. Some tools as outlined use a 428 
matrix approach. A risk matrix is a proven mechanism to semi-quantitatively characterise and 429 
rank risks but the overall risk score obtained by categorising likelihood and severity can be 430 
imprecise and vague (Markowski & Mannan, 2008). This semi-quantitative approach can 431 
produce uncertainties in the risk category determined (Manning, 2013).  Some tools may use a 432 
summative approach to determining risk, others to use multiplier factors when this is combined 433 
with overprediction or underprediction of some risk factors e.g. likelihood this will lead to a 434 
lack of consistency across the tools that can be used. Lack of technical know-how, failing to 435 
access appropriate databases, poor datasets or inappropriate use of databases will also limit the 436 
efficacy of FFVA tools. The emerging nature of food fraud incidents with there always being 437 
the potential for new actors, new agents being used means that the use of FFVA should not be 438 
an annual activity that is static and historic, but needs to be real-time and reactive if the process 439 
is going to provide a meaningful and relevant risk score.  440 
As outlined in this paper there is multiple terminology being used to determine 441 
vulnerability and risk which is a challenge in itself. This emerging terminology from evolving 442 
definitions of authenticity (Sumar & Ismail, 1995) to consideration of types of fraud and the 443 
lack of a harmonized definition of food fraud (Bouzembrak et al. 2018), human behavioral 444 
science, motivation, methods, ethical problems and social and criminal implications (Spink and 445 
Moyer, 2011; Manning & Soon, 2016; Lord, Elizondo, & Spencer, 2017). Specialists from 446 
social science and criminology backgrounds tend to give more emphasis to the social, economic 447 
and legal aspects of food fraud, while food scientists tend to focus on chemical characteristics 448 
of food, economic gain and t h e  i m p ac t  in terms of public health concerns. More 449 
collaborative work should be done, particularly with social science specialists, to achieve a 450 
universal definition of food fraud.  CODEX proposed an Electronic Working Group (EWG) to 451 
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review CODEX gaps and to create a definition and scope for food fraud, food integrity, food 452 
authenticity and other food fraud related terms. This is a major step forward to potentially 453 
incorporate food fraud into the formal Codex Alimentarius which can revamp the food supply 454 
chain as food fraud countermeasures will become a requirement when conducting business 455 
(Spink, 2017).   456 
Undertaking a supply chain FFVA requires the collection of information at the appropriate 457 
steps (points) along the supply chain including raw materials, ingredients, products, packaging, 458 
dispatch; evaluating each step to identify and prioritizing significant vulnerabilities for food 459 
fraud, and then developing appropriate countermeasures such as monitoring and testing 460 
strategies, supplier audits and anti‐counterfeit technologies (GFSI, 2014). Within a 461 
manufacturing business, effective FFVA requires the collection and evaluation of information 462 
on potential food fraud vulnerability associated with the products, processes and people 463 
employed (SSAFE, 2019a).   Spink and Moyer (2011a) argue that FFVA tools are not 464 
holistically applicable to quantify or predict food fraud incidents because an understanding of 465 
criminology and behavioural science is also required. However, FFVA will allow food 466 
businesses to map possible fraud scenarios associated with the materials and products that the 467 
organisation procures, produces and sells, in order to accurately identify the potential threat, 468 
the controls required and the mechanisms for updating such assessments if the evidence 469 
changes in the future. Therefore, vulnerability is specific to the supply base, ingredients, 470 
product, processes and activities undertaken by a given food manufacturer, processor or 471 
retailer. The vulnerability assessment process is dynamic and needs to be revisited both 472 
routinely in line with formal procedures and also reactively in the event that FFVA outputs are 473 
out of date, for example a vulnerability changes or appears because of a new supplier, harvest 474 
failure associated with one particular material or an increase in demand for a particular material 475 
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when supply remains constant. Therefore, FFVA tools identify the degree of food fraud 476 
vulnerability at a given time and in a given set of circumstances.     477 
5.0 Discussion 478 
Collaborative efforts between private and non-profit sector and governmental bodies 479 
will help to grow food fraud networks to address and tackle food fraud at a landscape level are 480 
hampered by the “pay to use” requirements of many incident databases and FFVA tools. A lack 481 
of consistency in coding within databases and the lack of a universal definition of food fraud 482 
needs to be addressed so it is possible to link, harmonise and connect multiple databases to 483 
share information and intelligence within and between networks. Food fraud assessment 484 
networks are developing. In the EU the FIN network is developing these collaborative 485 
knowledge building as is the work of the JRC (EU Science Hub, 2016).  To date four EU wide 486 
coordinated control plans (horsemeat, fish, honey and online food supplements and novel 487 
foods) had been developed to determine the extent of fraudulent practices in the food sector 488 
(EC, 2018).  These approaches are considering food fraud together with food and feed safety 489 
in a concerted approach but there is no global, universal, central intelligence database that is 490 
available to the food industry, regulators and investigators that brings together all the 491 
intelligence and information that is currently available. This creases an inequity in the food 492 
sector in that many SMEs cannot access such information. However some databases and tools 493 
are free to download and if they have sufficient knowledge and understanding SMEs can use 494 
this tools to start undertaking FFVA. Whilst some FFVA tools aid organisations to develop a 495 
vulnerability profile or vulnerability register for the business, not all go to the next step of 496 
developing a control plan.  As social network analysis research develops with regard to food 497 
fraud especially when combined with crime data mining and criminal network analysis this 498 
will assist further in the development of FFVA tools. Emerging tools that use data mining will 499 
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take existing FFVA and detection approaches forward towards more predictive food fraud 500 
modelling.  501 
Manning and Soon (2014) sought to draw together the elements of both a predictive 502 
and a reactive model for determining food fraud. This model included: determining the 503 
situational and contributing factors for food fraud, identifying the databases that provided 504 
information of interest in order to use FFVA tools and then to identify the factors that influence 505 
the resultant risk ranking. This approach is underpinned by the use of intelligence from 506 
industry, enforcement bodies, media and social network surveillance, economic trends, unusual 507 
factors that could affect supply and demand dynamics and consider their effect. The detect and 508 
react phase of the Manning and Soon (2014) model differentiates between passive laboratory 509 
surveillance as part of routine testing programmes and active laboratory surveillance which is 510 
targeted on known adulterants that is utilised when the risk ranking status changes. This brings 511 
forward an important element of vulnerability assessment that is the use of passive (static) 512 
systems and models or the use of reactive and smart systems that are constantly evolving as 513 
new intelligence comes in. In these tools it can be shown that vulnerability can be considered 514 
as a product, technical or system attribute: in terms of a weakness or flaw. An internal 515 
vulnerability assessment can build understanding of the weaknesses, criticalities and access 516 
points within a specific manufacturing environment where there are food fraud vulnerabilities.  517 
Other tools, or stages within tool application see vulnerability as a risk i.e. the degree of 518 
exposure (likelihood x severity) reflect on vulnerability in terms of the consequences i.e. the 519 
degree of loss or damages should the incident occur. The other two elements of vulnerability 520 
described in this paper are: the ability or capacity of an organisation or supply chain to return 521 
to a steady state i.e. determining vulnerability  in terms of ability to return to the status quo; 522 
and the need for resilience and for the organisation or supply chain to drive continuous 523 
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improvement in the medium to long term. This needs to be addressed in further iterations of 524 
models that drive effective vulnerability reduction action plans. 525 
6. Conclusion 526 
   The databases considered here both complement and underpin the various FFVA tools 527 
described, but due to multiple types of food fraud issue, a lack of skills and understanding by 528 
people of how to use FFVA and variable scopes of assessments means that inconsistency in 529 
vulnerability scoring can occur. There is a clear requirement for more industry level 530 
cohesiveness and consistency in how FFVA is undertaken to address both intrinsic and 531 
extrinsic food fraud vulnerability.   532 
FFVA tools differ from conventional purely food safety hazard analysis or risk assessment 533 
tools as FFVA also requires consideration of a number of socio-economic factors. These 534 
include: economic conditions, social and opportunistic issues, knowledge levels of 535 
organization that might make them more vulnerable to fraud, as well as an understanding of 536 
criminal behavior. The impact of fluctuations in market conditions that influence both 537 
perpetrator opportunity, level of economic gain derived and thus the rationalization of whether 538 
to commit fraud, or not are also of importance in assessing vulnerability. The challenge for 539 
policy makers and the industry is therefore to develop FFVA tools so that they can support 540 
assessment of existing vulnerabilities and also overcome knowledge gaps in where and how 541 
fraud might occur. Further, the situational vulnerabilities for a given organization or food 542 
supply chain is of importance to effectively inform the appropriate options for food fraud 543 
control and mitigation at the organization and supply chain level. 544 
  545 
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Table 1. Types of food fraud. (Adapted from Spink & Moyer, 2011a; 2011b; Lotta & 852 
Bogue, 2015; Spink et al., 2016: CWA,17369:2019). 853 
 854 
Types of food fraud 
 
Deception during manufacture 
Overrun (intentional overproduction, sometimes called the “third shift” 
Overtreating (including adding more water than allowed by regulation),  
Diversion into illicit supply chains 
Diversion, 
Smuggling 
Theft 
Duplication 
Simulation,   
Counterfeiting 
Interventions with the food product 
Adulteration  
Addition 
Substitution,  
Product tampering 
Removal 
Unapproved processes  
Misrepresentation 
Misdescription 
Record tampering 
Misrepresentation of food characteristics, country of origin, food ingredients or food 
packaging,  
Claim violation   
False or misleading statements made about a product for economic gain  
Underweight product  
 
855 
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Table 2. Types of sampling    857 
 858 
Term Description 
Sampling The process of selecting a subgroup of a population to represent the entire population. 
Sampling strategy A sampling strategy is the approach used to select the units of the target population subject to official controls e.g. businesses, foodstuffs, etc 
Routine surveillance Sampling strategy where samples are taken to check compliance levels and detect previously unidentified issues. Routine surveillance may be risk-based, with 
samples selected to match some form of risk rating. Surveillance may be planned and funded at a national level, such as through EU competent authorities through 
national sampling programmes, or locally determined.  Local sampling plans may be informed by national priorities as well as local assessment of risks. 
 
Types of sampling 
 
Availability sampling See convenience sampling 
Census sampling Sampling strategy that samples the totality of the population on which the data is reported. 
Convenience or 
convenient sampling 
A non-probability sampling strategy that uses the most easily accessible people (or cases) to participate in a study. Also know as opportunity sampling and 
availability sampling or strategy based on the selection of a sample for which units are selected only on the basis of feasibility or ease of data collection. It's a not 
random sampling. The data reported refer themselves to units selected according to this strategy. 
Judgmental sampling See suspect sampling 
Objective sampling Selection of a random sample from a population on which the data are reported. 
Opportunity sampling See convenience sampling  
Probability sampling The probability sampling method gives each eligible element/unit a known (and commonly equal) chance of being selected in the sample; random procedures are 
employed to select a sample using a sampling frame. Also known as random sampling 
Purposive sampling A non-probability sampling strategy in which the researcher selects participants who are considered to be typical of the wider population (sometimes referred to as 
judgmental sampling) 
Quota sampling A non-probability sampling strategy where the researcher identifies the various strata of a population and ensures that all these strata are proportionately 
represented within the sample to increase its representativeness 
Random sampling See probability sampling 
Selective sampling Sampling strategy is based on the selection of a random sample from a subpopulation (or more frequently from subpopulations) of a population on which the data 
are reported. The subpopulations are can but are not always determined on a risk basis. The sampling from each subpopulation is not proportional: the sample size 
is proportionally bigger for instance in subpopulations considered at high risk. This sampling includes also the case when the data reported refer to censuses on 
subpopulations 
Snowball sampling A non-probability sampling strategy whereby referrals from earlier participants are used to gather the required number of participants 
Statutory sampling Official sampling undertaken where the products to be tested as well as frequency of the said testing is set out in law to control specific health risks. 
Stratified sampling Probability based sampling where the population is divided into specific groups (strata) and a sample is drawn from each group. 
Suspect sampling Suspect sampling or enforcement related sampling is a form of judgmental sampling where the selection of an individual product or establishment is done in order 
to confirm or reject a suspicion of non-conformity. Sampling strategy where samples are taken as part of enforcement investigations.  
 859 
Sources: (Huddersfield University, nd; Eurostat, 2010; Wright, Ibrahim, Manning & McKellar, 2014) 860 
 861 
  862 
©Louise Manning and Jan Mei Soon   33 
 
Table 3. Comparison of databases that provide information that can be used in a food fraud vulnerability assessment. 863 
 864 
Name Accessibility Openness 
Maturity 
Level 
Purpose Functionality Source of data Downloading of 
data 
FFVA Capacity 
RASFF 
System 
Free to access Leaders Competent 
authority 
information 
exchange 
forum  
Searchable with classifications Purposive, random or 
reactive, sampling 
from regulatory 
sampling 
Free to download Database only no additional 
vulnerability assessment 
tool. 
 
Food Fraud 
Risk 
Information 
Database 
Free to access top 
level data – pay to 
view database 
Followers Information 
exchange 
forum 
Categorised into lists by product type 
or time period. Ability to subscribe to 
a list or an individual card 
On-line news items 
and alerts 
Data lists are 
accessible but pay 
to download a 
historic database 
on a spreadsheet 
Database with a risk rating 
(high, medium, low) risk 
assessment criteria not 
shown. No additional 
vulnerability assessment 
tool. 
Decernis Food 
Fraud 
Database 
Pay to access 
Annual subscription 
or 30 day subscription 
Beginners Database to 
enable FFVA 
Categorised by ingredients with 
search capabilities and analytics 
Scientific articles, 
media, regulatory and 
judicial reports and 
food industry and 
trade associations 
No free data Database and associated 
FFVA capability within the 
tool. 
Food 
Adulteration 
Incident 
Registry 
(FAIR). 
Pay to access annual 
subscription 
Information over five 
years old is free 
Followers Incident 
database 
Categorised by incident  Publically available 
data 
Data over five 
years old is freely 
accessible 
Database and associated 
with FOODSHIELD a 
collaborative platform and 
the Intentional Adulteration 
Assessment Tool (IAAT) 
for food defence 
Food Integrity 
Network 
(FIN) 
Subscription based on 
personal credentials – 
Stakeholder or expert 
Horizonscan is a 
subscription only 
service 
Beginners Incident 
database 
Categorised by incident  Suspected and actual 
incidents of 
adulteration 
No free data Database and knowledge 
network – linked to Horizon 
Scan. No FFVA capability. 
MedISys-FF Open access Leaders European 
Commission 
database 
Categorised by type of disease, food 
safety hazard or threat 
Publically available 
media information 
Freely available Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
The US FDA 
Recalls, 
Market 
Withdrawals 
and Safety 
Alerts 
Database 
 
Open access Leaders Regulators 
database of 
issued alerts 
Categorised by recall type by 
commodity e.g. food, cosmetics etc. 
Regulatory data. 
Publically available 
database 
Freely available Database of alerts that is 
searchable. Older data is 
archived but available. No 
FFVA capability. 
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UKFSS 
Database 
Private database None Incident and 
sampling 
database 
Private system Regulatory sampling No freely 
available data 
Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
Private 
laboratory 
databases 
Private databases None Sampling 
databases 
Private system Market sampling 
systems 
No freely 
available data  
Database. No FFVA 
capability. 
  865 
Table 4. Comparison of the two FFVA tools provided by Food Fraud Advisors (2018) 866 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool v3.0s 
 
Vulnerability Assessment Tool (BRC method) 
Suitable for ingredients, raw materials such as processing aids, additives, packaging 
materials, finished products, dietary supplements, herbal remedies (oral), functional food 
additives and ‘boosters’ 
Suitable for food ingredients 
Addresses all aspects of food fraud Addresses economically motivated adulteration, substitution and dilution 
Based on the methodology recommended by Michigan State University Food Fraud 
Initiative 
Based on the method recommended by the British Retail Consortium 
(BRC) 
Generates a report containing: 
Purpose and scope 
Likelihood of food fraud and impact (severity) of food fraud 
The results of the vulnerability assessment in a risk matrix format 
Optional initial screening (pre-filter) step  
Optional controls report 
Generates a report containing: 
Purpose and scope 
Likelihood of occurrence of food fraud for the material 
Likelihood of detection of food fraud 
The results of the vulnerability assessment in a risk matrix format 
 
Suitable to meet the requirements of all major food safety standards and can be used by food 
businesses that do not operate a formal food safety management system 
Designed to meet the requirements of BRC Food Safety Issue 8. 
Easy to review and update 
Results and data can easily be copied and pasted into other documents 
Save, file and print the results for your next audit 
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